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Abstract 
People often find it difficult to make the right decision about retirement savings. The payoffs are in the 
distant future, and the promise of pleasure tomorrow can mean pain today. The wrong decision yields an 
instant gain, the outcome is uncertain, the decision can be postponed without immediate penalty. In the 
end, the pressures of immediate gratification, delayed benefit, the unknown, the uncertain, the 
uncomfortable, ally against wise decisions. Yet, while many people yield to these influences, many others 
make the right choice. That drives us to ask why. Recent research has examined various approaches to 
promoting retirement investment. One promising strategy, automatic enrollment, taps into an old theory 
about the functional order of behavior and attitudes. This chapter examines the theory to understand why 
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Chapter 2
Motivating Retirement Planning: 
Problems and Solutions
Gary W. Selnow
Retirement saving advocates face one of the most daunting communication
tasks imaginable. They seek to promote within the labor force a willingness
to set aside scarce resources for some distant age that the worker may or may
not reach, for rewards that the worker may or not achieve, at a price today
that the worker may not wish to pay. This is a tough sell, however, recent
research and an old theory lend some guidance and encouragement. This
chapter looks at the nature of the challenge and the rationale for some
interesting solutions.
To motivate our discussion, though, I offer a story from the Balkans
which helps illuminate how some people view their financial circumstances
to be driven by fate. It takes place on a river that forms the border between
Slovenia, part of the former Yugoslavia, and Austria, part of the West.
People tell of a Slovenian fisherman who had been laboring for hours but
had not caught a fish; the poor fellow had felt not even the tug of a fish on
his line. Meanwhile, on the other side of the river in Austria, a young boy
was reeling in fish by the bucketful. He would toss out his line, and before
it struck the water’s surface, a fish would leap up and grab the hook in 
mid-air. Eventually, the fisherman could bear it no longer and looked
about for a way to cross the river. Since he could find no boats or bridges,
the Slovenian man shouted at the boy, “Hey, how did you cross the river?”
The boy stared back for a moment, and then yelled back, “I was born here!”
In short, fate—in our case, financial fate—is often determined from
birth. Depending on which side of the river you are born on, you can live a
charmed life or a life of toil and frustration. The hard truth is, some people
need not bother with plans for retirement: This problem is settled for them
at birth. Most people, however, find themselves on the wrong shore and
accept this as their fate. That being so, one job for retirement savings plan-
ners is to show people how they can get to the other side of the river, where
the retirement fishing is good.
Investing for retirement is different from just about anything else people
are asked to do. Along nearly every dimension, tucking away money today
for a more secure tomorrow violates basic human inclinations. The savings
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ethic is resistant to nearly all of the motivators we commonly use to encour-
age desired behaviors, which robs retirement planning advocates of the
most useful and effective tools to stimulate wise investment decisions.
In thinking about these problems, I reflect on the challenges I have faced
over the years in recent years, persuading people to alter their behaviors.
Most recently, we set out to tackle the HIV/AIDS tragedy in Africa, and our
communication work has had some real success. Nevertheless, tackling the
AIDS problem, as overwhelming as that is, is quite different from the chal-
lenges communicators face getting people to save for retirement. In the
regions where I work, people see the evidence of AIDS all around them.
Each morning they arise to the palpable devastation wrought by the plague,
each night they fall asleep haunted by their private fears that it will infect
them as well. Stories from communities being slaughtered by AIDS chill the
soul. Our message of caution and hope is well received because the audi-
ence is ready. Moreover, opinion leaders figure prominently in our design as
we work closely with traditional healers and birth attendants who are
revered within the communities. Our job is to establish credibility, connect
the behaviors with the outcomes, and teach about alternatives.
By contrast, retirement issues have less conspicuous consequences, and
they lack the stunning horrors that reign in AIDS-infected communities.
Moreover, in the AIDS work, the lapse time between behavior and con-
sequence is much shorter, and the outcomes are more certain. These condi-
tions enable us to use persuasive methods not available to advocates of
retirement savings, because as important as retirement preparations may
be, their structure deprives advocates of many tools.
Another of our recent assignment involves the development of attitudes
favorable toward reconciliation, in places where reconciliation is a four-letter
word. We work throughout the Balkans—in Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro,
Kosovo, and now Serbia—to encourage people of different ethnicities to live
together in peace. We have seen some evidence of steps in the right direction
where isolated communities that once quite literally battled over backyard
fences, have begun to patch up old wounds. This is taking place with the
efforts of many indigenous and international organizations, but I would like
to think that we have made a contribution. In places that exaggerate the dif-
ferences between people, we emphasize the features that people share. We
join parents through their children at multiethnic schools, and more
recently we have connected people through medical programs. Illness does
not discriminate: Heart disease, asthma, cancer, and HIV/AIDS, cut a cruel
swath across the human race. Our programs remind people that everyone
shares these assaults, and there are bigger enemies that stand over us
all. Attitudes and behaviors here, too, are structurally different from the
attitudes and behaviors retirement planners seek to change. Where I work,
people have lived through the consequences of corrosive thinking and
destructive actions. They know that a bad decision or a good one can mani-
fest itself immediately to their benefit or to their ruin. And again, retirement
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issues are unlike these issues and they do not allow supporters to tap the
human motivators that we can access in our work. Problems faced by retire-
ment savings advocates are quite different and quite frustrating.
It is also worth noting that techniques which increase voting, garner
political support, improve diet and exercise, get people to brush their
teeth, paint their houses, and vaccinate their children, are fundamentally
different from getting people to save for retirement. No matter how I size
it up, the conclusion is the same retirement savings issues are unique in
several ways:
First, the payoff for behavioral change is quite uncertain. Saving for retirement
is a gamble, and the truth is, no one can promise that money set aside will
ever come back to us. We may die, financial markets may crash, and events
on this troubled and treacherous planet can change our fates.
Second, workers do not easily buy the idea of payoffs in the distant future. For
a here-and-now, instant-gratification society, this is troubling. Ben Franklin
advised us that if we wanted to be wealthy, we should “think of saving as well
as getting.” For many people today, Ben’s advice falls on deaf ears.
Third, the promise of pleasure tomorrow means pain today. This is a hard sell.
Setting aside even a few dollars each month is most painful when the need
for cash is greatest—when one is raising children, buying a home, paying
for education. A pleasant and secure retirement is a daydream, when the
mortgage comes due and the kids need braces.
Fourth, the wrong decision yields instant gain. This is the flip side: When the
worker chooses not to save that $100, he is immediately rewarded with $100
that he can enjoy in the here-and-now. Instant gratification is very familiar.
Fifth, there is no immediate tangible reward. One’s sacrifices, good judgments,
loyalties to one’s future-self, yield little today of the self than a vague satisfac-
tion. Citizens of the material world are motivated by fast automobiles, hand-
some clothes, good food, and drink: These are the rewards and symbols of
success. Money planted deep for retirement bears none of those harvests,
and it returns only a promise bound to a probability. The contingent–reward
link is broken, which undermines a powerful behavioral motivator.
Sixth, the saving decision can be postponed without immediate penalty. Workers
suffer little today if they fail to save for tomorrow; they deprive themselves
of nothing, now, and they walk away from this unfulfilled duty unaltered
and unharmed.
And finally, there are no functional deadlines. People believe they do not have
to save today and do not have to save tomorrow. The immediate rewards
for deciding to save grow no greater and the punishments for declining to
save become no more severe. It is not like failing to pay the mortgage, or the
water bill, since letting those deadlines go, makes quick trouble. With retire-
ment savings, there is always tomorrow and the day after tomorrow.
As a result, the pressures of immediate gratification, delayed benefit, the
unknown, the uncertain, the uncomfortable, the deferrable, all ally against
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the wiser choices. And they also strip retirement planning advocates of
powerful human motivators and inducements. Furthermore, the details of
retirement savings are complicated for average people. The laws and rules
are esoteric and ever-changing. Too many options confuse people: SEP
plans, 401ks, 402ks, IRAs, 403bs and the rest, form in the public mind, a
confusing stew of options that for many people are easier left for another
time, another place.
On top of all this, most young people are firmly convinced they will
always be young; belief in one’s immortality is a mighty force. And, peer
pressure is scarce: Discussions about financial preparations for retirement
do not arise spontaneously around the water cooler, and friends do not
pressure one another about retirement set-asides.
Finally, Social Security is an easy palliative. Although ill-fated, under-
funded, and precariously unprotected, Social Security is, in many people’s
minds, that secret place for comfort when thoughts tread near retirement
savings. Consequently, judgments become clouded by complexities, legal-
ities, choices, norms, and expectations. Sometimes it seems a wonder
anyone bothers to save for retirement at all. Yet, many people do save and
the question is what motivates them to do so? The literature suggests a vari-
ety of reasons, programs, and conditions that lead to or are associated with
retirement savings decisions. For one, older people save more than
younger people (Hogarth, 1991; Zhong, 1994); more educated people save
more than less educated people; employees with higher incomes put aside
more than employees with lower incomes (Zhong, 1994). We would be sur-
prised to learn otherwise. These facts are good to know, but not prescript-
ive. Retirement advocates cannot do much here, other than urge people to
attend college then wait for them to age and earn more money.
The literature says, further, that people with a future orientation save more
than people who live for the here and now (Munnell, Sundén, and Taylor,
2000). A popular analyst proposes that people who are content with what
they have—and thus seek fewer possessions—are those more likely to save for
the years beyond (Richey, 2002). But how this can be of use to motivate peo-
ple who live for today, or those who are not content with what they have?
Maybe advisers could promote favorable attitude formation by dislodging
cultural preoccupations with the present, but this would acquire house-
to-house combat in a society where a focus on the present is woven into
the fabric of every popular message, of every public and private institution.
Consider that Congress looks no further than the next election, companies
plan quarter-by-quarter, and public policy fixes on immediate impact.
What about other motivators? For example, education can build knowl-
edge that can inspire a rational person to action. To be sure, education
about saving is a consistent theme in the literature: People aware of the
need to save and familiar with investment options are more likely to set
aside money for later. The cause and effect relationships are not entirely
46 Gary W. Selnow
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clear in many studies: Does education bring about investment decisions, or
do investment decisions stimulate an interest in learning about saving?
Either way, many analysts believe that education is the key.1 Joo and Grable
(2000) argue that workplace financial education boosts the likelihood of
having a retirement investment or savings program. They argue, further,
that family and consumer economists can help individuals plan for retire-
ment with additional financial education. Hershey and Mowen (2000) find
that training programs designed to boost financial knowledge trigger
advanced planning activities, and they also demonstrate the value of audi-
ence segmentation based on attitudinal characteristics.
Whether education relates favorably to retirement planning behaviors
because it cultivates skills, nurtures attitudes, or simply responds to predis-
positions, is less important than the finding of education’s relevance. This
is a comfort, because the last thing I want to suggest is that we have been
barking up the wrong tree. But I do suggest that, so far, our educational
approach has been vulnerable to the natural resistance people display
toward investing in their distant futures. Yes, education impacts many
employees, but the alarming fact remains that 70 percent of American
workers have not even calculated their financial needs for retirement, half
have made negligible contributions to their retirement funds, and fully
15 percent have saved nothing for their later years (EBRI, 2002). So large
numbers of employees remain untouched by the best efforts of educators
who would teach them about the virtues of salting away funds for later.
Is there a way around the natural defenses against retirement savings? Is
there a way to defeat the resistance, the reluctance, the refusal of employees
who balk at the advice to save? Is there a better way to cross the river?
Maybe the answer is yes. Several researchers have been looking at the value
of automatically enrolling employees in retirement investment programs.
I believe this automatic enrollment approach may be the way to end-run
the natural blocks evident in the persuasion-resistant activity. They also tap
into a theory that I believe has great relevance to this discussion.
To elaborate on this point, I make reference to the work of Choi et al.
(2001a), who reported that “automatic enrollment has a dramatic impact
on retirement savings behavior: 401(k) participation rates at all three firms
(they studied) exceed 85 percent.” The researchers found that participants
usually anchored at the lowest saving default rates, and in the most conserva-
tive vehicles, but this does not detract from the fact that enrollment led to
dramatic participation. Why does automatic enrollment have the impact
they reported? Choi and his co-authors also find that employees follow the
“path of least resistance” (Choi et al., 2001b). In other words, it is easier to
keep on doing what you are doing, than it is to change. So for sailing ships
and employees alike, steering straight ahead is easier than changing
course. Once the employee is enrolled, they stay enrolled; if they are not
enrolled, they remain not enrolled. The lesson is clear: Enroll employees
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automatically and plan sponsors will have set them on the proper course
for the other side of the river.
This interesting research brought to mind a book by psychologist Daryl
Bem, who in his book, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs (1970), discusses
a theory whose arrangement of variables violates convention. Most of us
subscribe to the notion that people first acquire knowledge, from know-
ledge we form attitudes, and from the attitudes flow our consequent behav-
iors. Knowledge shapes attitudes, and then behavior. But Bem argues that
sometimes behavior comes first. Sometimes we find ourselves behaving in a
certain way, and we infer from that behavior our attitudes. In Bem’s words,
“(it is a) common assumption that one cannot change the behavior of
(people) until one has changed ‘hearts and minds’ first . . . in fact, one of
the most effective ways of changing the ‘hearts and minds’ of (people) is to
change their behavior first” (Bem, 1970: 3). His examples include racial
integration during the early 1950s and 1960s, citing instances where people
with the strongest positive attitudes toward integration were those who
were positioned to experience integration first-hand. Further, other
research on integration demonstrated that “the cause-effect sequence most
often appears to be ‘behavior first, then attitudes’ ” (Bem, 1970: 68).
A good example of this point occurred when President Truman banned
segregation in the armed forces with a stroke of the pen in 1948. The very
fact of suspicious whites having to live and work and serve with blacks paid
off in the striking improvement of attitudes. Of course, attitudes about race
changed for blacks as well as for whites. Military people, by virtue of the
government’s power to impose behavior on the troops, had for years been
well ahead of civilians on attitudes toward racial matters.
Another example of knowledge first, then attitudes, occurred in
California during the 1990s. Over a period of time, California tightened
regulations on cigarette smoking, first restricting smoking in public build-
ings and, then in workplaces and in restaurants; then curtailing smoking
outside near the doors of public buildings, workplaces, and restaurants;
and most recently, in 1998, the State banned smoking in bars, the last
citadels for smokers (California Department of Health Services, 2001).
Currently, Californians are allowed to smoke only in caves with fewer than
two occupants and in aluminum kayaks anchored beyond the 3-mile limit!
What has been the result? The California Department of Health Services
reports the following: “During the 1990s in California, smoking behaviors
and attitudes about smoking have changed, as measured by the California
Tobacco Surveys and other data sources (emphasis added). The net effect
has been not only a drop in smoking rates at twice the national average, but
a corresponding change in public attitudes toward smoking as well. Were
attitudes changing anyway? Perhaps, but the behavioral changes imposed
by the regulations are likely responsible for the accelerated shifts in the way
people have come to view smoking.”
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Even if behavior changes first and then attitudes, how does this work?
Bem emphasizes two dynamics. First, cognitive dissonance is key. This is the
uncomfortable sense that develops when we act in a way that is incongru-
ous with our beliefs. Second, self-perception theory suggests inasmuch as
we infer the attitudes of others by observing their behaviors, we often infer
our own attitudes by observing our own behaviors. We behave according to
situational demands and then infer from that what our beliefs must be. We
do this because we dislike the discomfort of incongruity between behaviors
and beliefs, and because we believe we are rational and logical and hence
interpret our self-conceptions by way of what we see in our own behavior.
One condition must be in place: We must see ourselves as having an
escape, and having at least some choice in the behavior. Why? Because if
we believe we are coerced, the force of coercion becomes the obvious
explanation for our behaviors rather than our supporting beliefs. So, peo-
ple seem logical and consistent—or at least they like to believe this about
themselves—and accordingly, their behaviors cue our attitudes as long as
they have at least some choice in the matter.
What does behavior-first have to do with automatic enrollment? What does
it have to do with getting people to the other side of the river? The studies
show that automatic enrollment with an easy escape offers the initial beha-
vior. People may stay the course of least resistance, but effort alone may not
explain the fact that nine of ten employees stay with an automatic retirement
savings program after 6 months, and after 36 months the enrollment num-
bers remain about a third higher than for employees not under automatic
enrollment plans. In other words, people who examine their savings beha-
vior may infer that their own values and beliefs actually support the merits of
retirement savings. Automatic enrollment imposed the initial behavior. The
path of least resistance may help employees stay the course, and the fact that
they were enrolled and could unenroll at any time of their choosing—but
did not unenroll—may actually lead to altered beliefs about savings.
One further point bears mention. If attitudes do, in fact, change in light
of behavior, then we might anticipate reasonable success with automatic
upgrading of enrollment programs as well. Research finds that “employees do
succeed in raising their contribution rates if they are given a low-effort oppor-
tunity to sign up for an automatic schedule of increases in their contribution
rate” (Choi et al., 2001b). Why is this so? It must be more than “stay the
course,” because even the low-effort opportunity requires some action that we
would not reasonably expect, unless supporting attitudes were in place.
Employees who have come to look favorably at the concept of retirement sav-
ing and accept the practice at the entry level are more likely to accept incre-
mental increases. The hard work has been done; the basic belief has been
forged. Automatic enrollment, coupled with automatic upgrades proposed
the “Save More Tomorrow” plan advocated by Benartzi and Thaler (2004), fit
reasonably well into the “behavior-first” model of attitude formation.2
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An automatic enrollment approach has a real chance of success because
it skirts the natural impediments to employee-initiated investment plans
noted earlier. The delay and uncertainty of payoffs, the deferral of rewards,
the imposition of sacrifices and other pains and suffering of initiating a
retirement savings plan become less relevant. The behavior-first model
begins with automatic enrollment, but it must not end there. Employee
education will continue to play a significant role. The huge advantage of
behavior-first is that it puts in place the mechanisms of attitude change that
could not only make employees more supportive of savings behaviors, but
can also heighten their interests in educational messages. Automatic
enrollment programs should, therefore, include employee educational ele-
ments that prepare people for their active involvement in the ongoing
maintenance and fine-tuning of their retirement savings plans. Approaches
to employee education laid out by many advocacy groups are not only valid,
but they are essential to the long-term success of the plan. With education,
we complete the cycle: Behavior, attitudes, and knowledge, knowledge, atti-
tudes, and behavior—each element supporting the other in maintaining
the employees’ involvement in retirement savings.
Fortified by ongoing employee education, automatic enrollment has
genuine appeal because it begins where other approaches hope to end, and
it appears promising because it sets in motion dynamics often overlooked.
The nice thing about the behavior-first approaches is that they come at little
cost, they preserve employee discretion, and they do not replace the need
for ongoing education and similar interventions that arm employees with
tools for greater control of their own financial futures. This is a promising
and fruitful means of helping people to the other side of the river.
Notes
1 See, for instance, Richardson (1993), Taylor-Carter, Cook, and Weinberg (1997),
Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (1997) and many others.
2 Benartzi and Thaler (2004), discuss a “Save More Tomorrow” plan where employ-
ees agree in advance to earmark a portion of their future pay increases for retire-
ment savings. Promise today to pay more tomorrow, but this time, put it in writing.
They report considerable success noting that 78% who were offered the plan chose
to use it; almost everyone who joined remained in it through two pay raises, and
four out of five stayed with it into the third pay raise; and the average saving rates
increased from 3.5% to 11.6% in 28 months.
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